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On 5 February the European Commission announced the 
start of the review of the economic governance framework 
for the European Union (EU). It further offered an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the current surveillance 
framework.1 Figure 1 shows the main phases and 
characteristics of the review. The first phase of the process 
will involve an extensive public consultation, running to 
mid-2020, in which all European institutions, the Member 
States and civil society will participate. The Commission 
will give itself until end-2020 to assess the opinions 
received, reflect on the steps to be taken and submit, if 
appropriate, a formal proposal for reform. 
The EU’s economic governance framework has undergone 
numerous changes since its inception, progressively 
adapting to the new requirements arising during the 
European construction process. In its initial design, the 
framework was chiefly geared to preventing the effects of 
excessive budgetary imbalances on financial stability in a 
monetary union. The 2005 reform sought to add some 
flexibility with a view to being able to address adverse 
cyclical situations. Following the 2008 economic and 
financial crisis, the focus moved once more to the risks 
that high levels of public debt entail for euro area economic 
and financial stability. Against this background, the latest 
“six-pack” and “two-pack” legislative reforms were 
implemented in 2011 and 2013, respectively. These 
introduced elements to strengthen the sustainability of 
public finances, to add flexibility to fiscal rules and to 
improve the Member States’ budgetary processes. In 
addition, surveillance was extended beyond the fiscal 
domain to address macroeconomic imbalances from a 
broader perspective (under the Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure), and a macroeconomic oversight 
procedure was set in place for those countries receiving 
financial assistance. These changes were integrated into 
the European Semester, the framework conceived to 
coordinate economic policies at the European level and to 
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1   Community regulations require the European Commission to conduct an economic governance framework review every five years, and to submit a 
report on the implementation of the existing legislation. 
SOURCE: European Commission.
How to ensure fiscal policies that 
safeguard long-term sustainability and
allow for short-term stabilisation?
How can the framework ensure sustainable 
fiscal policies, help eliminate existing 
macroeconomic imbalances and avoid
new ones arising? 
How can the framework ensure 
effective enforcement?
What is the appropriate role for the EU 
surveillance framework in incentivising 
Member States to undertake key reforms 
and investment?
How can the EU framework be simplified 
and the transparency of its implementation 
be improved?
How should the framework take into 
consideration the euro area dimension
and the agenda towards deepening
the Economic and Monetary Union?
Figure 1
REFORM STAGES AND MAIN AREAS OF DEBATE
TIMELINE
5 February 2020 H1 End of
2020
The Commission presents 
a review of economic 
governance and launches 
a debate on its future
Consultation Reflection
The Commission begins to 
engage with different parties 
to seek their views
The Commission considers the 
views of the sectors involved 
and completes its reflections 
on possible future steps
This early-release box was published on 9 March
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steer the structural reforms necessary at the national 
level. 
According to the Commission, the essential aim of the 
review under way is to strengthen the effectiveness of its 
oversight. It is mindful that the current macroeconomic 
environment, marked by low potential growth, population 
ageing and low interest rates, is very different from that of 
previous reforms. At the same time, the EU has to respond 
to new challenges, such as digitalisation and climate 
change (as seen with the European Green Pact).  
The consultation addresses various issues: the means of 
ensuring compliance with accountable fiscal policies, 
increasing the transparency, flexibility and simplicity of 
the rules; the review of the macroeconomic imbalances 
procedure; increased incentives for investment and for 
structural reform; and enhanced economic policy 
coordination and the deepening of EMU. 
The assessment conducted by the Commission notes 
both the strengths and weaknesses of the current 
framework. As regards strengths, the Commission 
highlights the fact that the latest legislative reforms have 
reinforced the policy oversight framework, providing for 
the correction of economic imbalances and, specifically, 
the reduction of excessive budget deficits. At the same 
time, the Commission indicates the momentum given to 
ongoing economic convergence in the EU and greater 
economic policy coordination. Further, mention is made 
of the creation of independent fiscal institutions and of 
enhanced national budgetary processes and medium-
term fiscal planning procedures. 
However, the Commission also recognises in its 
assessment certain areas for improvement. Firstly, it notes 
that the ongoing incremental reform of the fiscal framework 
has led to greater complexity, with diverse procedures 
and numerous rules. Admittedly, this design sought to 
make the framework more flexible and adaptable. But it 
may also have deterred ownership of the fiscal rules (see 
Chart 1), while reducing transparency and hampering 
communication. 
Additionally, the Member States’ fiscal policies have 
retained some procyclical bias, as illustrated in Chart 2 
The Commission expresses particular concern over the 
lack of discipline in expansionary phases, during which 
countries have not sufficiently rebuilt their fiscal buffers. 
Such behaviour, according to the Commission, is 
expected to have restricted the capacity of the framework 
to coordinate national fiscal policies, with appropriate 
cross-country differentiation, and to attain a suitable fiscal 
stance for the euro area as a whole. 
The Commission also highlights the persistence of high 
levels of public debt in some countries, which are in turn 
far from meeting their medium-term fiscal targets (see 
Chart 3), while their reform-geared momentum appears to 
have slackened. 
Finally, another area for improvement is the quality of 
public finances. This covers both the composition of 
public spending and revenue, and their capacity to 
support growth and social inclusion. In this respect, the 
Commission stresses that public investment is the 
spending component that traditionally bears a high 
proportion of the adjustment in fiscal consolidation 
processes (see Chart 4), which underscores the 
importance of protecting this spending component in the 
design of the fiscal surveillance framework. 
The Commission’s analysis shares many of the concerns 
voiced by experts and international institutions. These 
refer to the need for a comprehensive review of the 
framework that reduces its complexity, enhances 
compliance and contributes to the design of countercyclical 
fiscal policies and to the sustainability of public finances.2 
In this connection, the review is timely and necessary. 
Moreover, it should be an integral part of the ongoing 
deepening and strengthening of EMU. In particular, the 
proposals envisaged should be completed with other 
elements that help enhance fiscal policy design and 
coordination at the European level, such as the introduction 
of a central fiscal capacity that reinforces the stabilising 
role of fiscal policy. 
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2   For an exhaustive review see, inter alia Andrle, M., J. Bluedorn, L. Eyraud, T. Kinda, P. Koeva Brooks, G. Schwartz and A. Weber (2015) “Reforming 
Fiscal Governance in the European Union” IMF Staff Discussion Note 15/09, May; Banco de España (2017), Annual Report 2016, Chapter 4, “Fiscal 
policy  in  the euro area”; Kamps, C., N. Leiner-Killinger  (2019) “Taking stock of  the  functioning of  the EU fiscal  rules and options  for reform” ECB 
Occasional  Paper,  No.  231,  August,  and  European  Fiscal  Board  (2019),  “Assessment  of  EU  fiscal  rules with  a  focus  on  the  six  and  two-pack 
legislation”, August.
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SOURCES: European Commission and Eurostat.
a Percentage (%) of years between 1999 and 2019 in which budget deficits exceeded 3% of GDP and public debt exceeded 60% of GDP.
b The scatter plot contains values of variables between 1999 and 2018.
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